Welcome to "Free Trade, Free Markets: Rating the Congress." This interactive web site allows users to examine how Congress and its individual members have voted over the years on bills and amendments affecting the freedom of Americans to trade and invest in the global economy. The web site includes votes previously examined in a series of Cato studies published from 1999 through 2005, as well as more recent votes. We would welcome any feedback on how the web site could be made even more useful.
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Permanent URL: http://www.freetrade.org/congress?tab=introduction | Printer-friendly version
Traditionally free trade has meant the lowering and eventual elimination of barriers to trade between nations. In the course of debate, those who favor free trade are characterized as internationalists. Pulling U.S. policy in the opposite direction are the protectionists, sometimes known as isolationists, who want to raise or at least maintain trade barriers and oppose trade expansion. But that simple, one-dimensional analysis disguises the true nature of the trade debate.
As a new, Democratic Congress begins to put its stamp on U.S. trade policy, the choice before members of both major parties will not be between engagement and isolation but between the free market and government intervention. The guiding question should be whether U.S. policy favors a free international market by advancing free trade and rejecting government intervention such as export and agricultural subsidies, or whether it favors intervention by not only maintaining and raising barriers to trade but also various subsidies.
Thus the real policy choices before Congress are not the two traditional paths of engagement or isolation but four paths. Through their votes on legislation, members of Congress can
1) oppose both trade barriers and trade subsidies,
2) oppose barriers and favor subsidies,
3) favor barriers and oppose subsidies, or
4. favor both barriers and subsidies.
By considering those four policy alternatives, this biannual study of congressional voting offers a more accurate and useful way of measuring how Congress as a whole and its individual members vote on issues affecting American involvement in the global economy. It analyzes 13 major votes in the House during the recently concluded 109th Congress and another 11 in the Senate affecting both trade barriers and trade subsidies. It then classifies members of Congress according to their degree of support for an international market free from the distorting effects of barriers and subsidies. The purpose of the study is to articulate a higher standard for free trade, and to measure the performance of the most recent Congress according to that standard.
Permanent URL: http://www.freetrade.org/congress?tab=methodology | Printer-friendly version
Despite all the hype about globalization and the supposed universal triumph of free-market policies, governments around the world continue to intervene in the flow of goods, services, people, and capital across international borders. That widespread intervention takes two basic forms: tax and regulatory barriers aimed at discouraging certain types of commerce, and direct, taxpayer subsidies aimed at encouraging or discouraging other types of commerce.
Trade Barriers
Trade barriers reduce global wealth by denying people and nations the ability to specialize in what they do best. Barriers protect higher-cost domestic producers from lower-cost competition abroad, raising domestic prices and drawing capital and labor away from industries that would be more competitive in global markets. Barriers to trade across international borders prevent producers from realizing the full benefits from economies of scale. By reducing competition, they stymie innovation and technological advances, reducing an economy's long-term growth.
Global tariff and nontariff barriers have fallen remarkably in the last 60 years, first among the richer, industrialized countries and more recently among those that are less developed. China is the most spectacular example of the latter. But barriers remain stubbornly high worldwide against free trade in agricultural products, textiles and clothing, and many basic services such as insurance and air travel. Those barriers cost hundreds of billions of dollars a year in lost wealth and keep hundreds of millions of people in poverty.
U.S. trade barriers continue to impose real costs on the U.S. economy despite postwar progress toward liberalization. The U.S. government maintains high, anti-consumer barriers to trade against such manufactured products shoes, clothing, watches, tableware, and textiles, and farm goods such as sugar, peanuts, cotton, dairy products, beef, canned tuna, frozen fruit and fruit juices. Other import barriers impose higher costs on U.S. producers, such as those against shipbuilding, softwood lumber, ball and roller bearings, pressed and blown glass, and coastal maritime shipping (through the Jones Act), jeopardizing jobs and production in import-consuming industries. Meanwhile, discriminatory antidumping laws 'protect' consumers and import-using industries from the benefits of competition and lower prices.
Trade Subsidies
Global commerce is further distorted by widespread use of subsidies aimed at promoting certain kinds of trade, investment, and domestic production. Those subsidies encourage overproduction of domestic agricultural products, through farm price supports, and exports and overseas investment in less-developed countries, through such agencies as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the Export-Import Bank. Indeed, many supporters of lower trade barriers look kindly on such subsidies because they seem to promote economic activity at home and 'engagement' in the global economy. But both kinds of intervention—barriers and subsidies—reduce our national welfare and curb the freedom of Americans to spend and invest their resources as they see fit.
Subsidies reduce national welfare by directing resources to less-efficient uses, substituting the judgment of government officials for that of private actors in the marketplace. Export subsidies such as those extended by the U.S. Export-Import Bank can raise demand for exports produced by the small number of U.S. multinational companies that benefit from its loans. But the increased production spurred by the extra exports raises costs for other, less-favored export industries competing for the same labor, capital, and intermediate inputs. They also crowd out unsubsidized exporters as foreign buyers bid up the price of U.S. dollars on foreign exchange markets to buy the more attractive, subsidized U.S. exports. Export subsidies also impose a higher burden on taxpayers.
Equally damaging to global trade and welfare are domestic subsidies to agriculture. Those subsidies encourage overproduction and the flooding of world markets with commodities sold at below their actual cost of production. Artificially lower world prices then discourage production in countries, typically the less-developed ones, where the costs of production are naturally lower. The biggest losers from the subsidies are taxpayers and consumers in rich countries and producers in poor countries.
Subsidies further undermine an efficient and open global economy by tainting the cause of liberalized trade. Advocates of subsidies imply that American companies can compete in an open global economy only if the playing field is 'leveled' by aggressive export promotion programs aimed at huge multinational corporations—as if free trade were inherently unfair unless offset by selective subsidies. Support for subsidies reinforces mistrust of the free market, reducing rather than encouraging support for free trade. International economic subsidies feed suspicions on the left and the right that free trade is just another form of corporate welfare.
Trade restrictions and subsidies are prompted by the same basic assumption: that Americans acting freely in the global marketplace cannot be trusted to spend their money in ways most beneficial to our national interest. That misconception leads to the policy error of thinking that government must therefore intervene, through either subsidies or restrictions, to produce an outcome different from what the market would create if left alone.
The Free-Trade Matrix:
No Barriers, No Subsidies
True supporters of free trade and free markets oppose not only protection but also market-distorting subsidies. That means the choice for policymakers is not merely between engagement in the global economy, subsidies and all, and isolation from it. The real choice is among four contrasting approaches to international economic policy: lower trade barriers without subsidies, lower barriers with subsidies, higher barriers with subsidies, and higher barriers without subsidies.
Combining trade barriers and trade subsidies as measures of free trade creates a two-dimensional matrix for evaluating public policy toward the free market and the international economy. That matrix allows a member's voting record to be classified in one of four broad categories rather than on the simplistic one-dimensional scale with free trade at one pole and protectionism at the other. (See Figure 1.) According to the matrix, members of Congress can be classified in one of four categories:
Free Traders
Free traders consistently vote against both trade barriers and international economic subsidies. The end result of their votes is to enhance the free market and the ability of Americans to decide for themselves how to spend their money in the global marketplace. This group opposes legislation restricting the choice of goods and services Americans may buy voluntarily—whether apparel from Guatemala, shoes from Vietnam, trucking services from Mexico, or vacations in Cuba—and opposes the forced expatriation of tax dollars through export subsidies, overseas investment guarantees, and government-to-government bailouts. Members of this group can lay rightful claim to the title of free traders because they support trade that is free of all types of government intervention, whether in the form of barriers or of subsidies.
Internationalists
Members of this group generally vote for trade liberalization but also support subsidies that they believe promote the same end. Their touchstone is not economic freedom but U.S. participation in the global economy through both expanded trade and direct government participation in the form of export subsidies and government-to-government loans. Internationalists are pro-trade, favoring the reduction of import barriers as generally good for the economy and even world peace, but they also believe the global economic system cannot work in America's interest without U.S. taxpayer subsidies.
Isolationists
This category includes members of Congress who tend to vote against reducing trade barriers and also oppose international economic subsidies. They can reasonably be called isolationists because they tend to oppose expanded American involvement in the global economy, whether through voluntary transactions or taxpayer subsidies. Isolationists show respect for their constituents as taxpayers by resisting tax-financed subsidies, but they question their judgment as consumers by restricting their freedom to buy, sell, and invest freely in the global marketplace.
Interventionists
Members of this group consistently support government intervention at the expense of the free market—favoring both subsidies and trade barriers. They tend to oppose bills and amendments that would lower trade barriers, as well as those that would cut or eliminate trade and investment subsidies. Interventionists reject the judgment of Americans twice, first by denying them full liberty to spend their private dollars beyond our borders and then by seeking to divert public tax dollars for export promotion and government-to-government bailout packages.
Permanent URL: http://www.freetrade.org/congress?tab=110th | Printer-friendly version
The 110th Congress considered 21 major bills and amendments in 2008-09 affecting the freedom of Americans to engage in international transactions. Below are descriptions of trade-related votes on the 2007/2008 farm bill, a ban on Mexican trucks in the United States, free trade agreements with Peru and Colombia, the Cuban trade embargo, the Andean Trade Preferences Act, visas for low-skilled workers, visa-waiver travel to the United States, and the bailout of two U.S. automobile producers.
Not all of those votes offer a pure test of support for free trade and international competition, but each represents a reasonably clear attempt to either expand or restrict the freedom to trade. The descriptions are not intended to provide a definitive argument for or against the legislation, but only to explain why, from a free-market perspective, the vote either hinders or promotes free trade as defined in the "Free Trade, Free Markets" study. Where available, sources are cited that provide more detailed arguments. (See Table 1 for a summary of House votes and Table 2 for a summary of Senate votes.)
The final section classifies individual members of Congress according to how they voted in the 110th Congress on legislation affecting the freedom to trade.
| Table 1 | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Major House Votes on Trade, 110th Congress | ||||||
| Roll | Free Trade | Final | % Voting Free Trade | |||
| Trade Barrier Votes | Date | Call # | Position | Vote | GOP | Dems |
| Bar Mexican Trucks from U.S. Roads | 5/15/2007 | 349 | No | 411-3 | 1% | 1% |
| Defund Visa Waiver Program | 6/15/2007 | 484 | No | 76-347 | 69% | 93% |
| Andean Trade Preferences Act | 6/27/2007 | 583 | Yes | 365-59 | 90% | 82% |
| Expand Farm Exports to Cuba | 7/27/2007 | 749 | Yes | 182-245 | 9% | 71% |
| Reduce Sugar Protection | 7/27/2007 | 751 | Yes | 144-282 | 46% | 23% |
| U.S.-Peru Free Trade Agreement | 11/8/2007 | 1060 | Yes | 285-132 | 92% | 48% |
| Suspend Colombia FTA Vote | 4/10/2008 | 181 | No | 224-195 | 97% | 4% |
| Defund Mexican Truck Program | 9/9/2008 | 575 | No | 395-18 | 8% | 1% |
| All Trade Barrier Votes | 58% | 47% | ||||
| Trade Subsidy Votes | ||||||
| Reduce Agricultural Subsidies | 7/27/2007 | 747 | Yes | 117-309 | 23% | 32% |
| Reduce "Loan Deficiancy" Payments | 7/27/2007 | 750 | Yes | 153-271 | 62% | 14% |
| Reduce Subsidies for Cotton Production | 7/27/2007 | 752 | Yes | 175-251 | 29% | 52% |
| 2008 Farm Bill | 5/14/2008 | 315 | No | 318-106 | 48% | 6% |
| 2008 Farm Bill Veto Override | 5/21/2008 | 346 | No | 316-108 | 48% | 6% |
| GM and Chrysler Bailout | 12/10/2008 | 690 | No | 237-170 | 82% | 9% |
| All Trade Subsidy Votes | 48% | 20% | ||||
| Source: Library of Congress, thomas.loc.gov/home/rollcallvotes.html | ||||||
| Table 2 | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Major Senate Votes on Trade, 110th Congress | ||||||
| Roll | Free Trade | Final | % Voting Free Trade | |||
| Short Description | Date | Call # | Position | Vote | GOP | Dems |
| Eliminate Temporary Worker Program | 5/22/2007 | 174 | No | 31-64 | 96% | 38% |
| Cut Temporary Workers Visas | 5/23/2007 | 175 | No | 74-24 | 44% | 4% |
| Defund Mexican Truck Pilot Program | 9/11/2007 | 331 | No | 75-23 | 47% | 0% |
| Peru Free Trade Agreement | 12/4/2007 | 413 | Yes | 77-18 | 98% | 64% |
| All Trade Barriers Votes | 71% | 26% | ||||
| Farm, Nutrituion and Bioenergy Act of 2007 | 12/14/2007 | 434 | No | 79-14 | 23% | 7% |
| Food and Energy Security Act of 2007 | 5/15/2008 | 130 | No | 81-15 | 27% | 4% |
| Food and Energy Security Act Veto Override | 5/22/2008 | 140 | No | 82-13 | 24% | 4% |
| All Trade Subsidy Votes | 25% | 5% | ||||
| Source: Library of Congress, thomas.loc.gov/home/rollcallvotes.html | ||||||
•Ban Mexican Trucks on U.S. Roads The expansion of trade between the United States and Mexico has been hampered by regulations that restrict cross-border trucking. Under provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement, qualified trucking providers from Mexico would be allowed to deliver goods within the United States after the year 2000, and U.S. trucking companies would be allowed to deliver goods within Mexico. Although the agreement and subsequent regulations specifically address safety concerns, Congress has so far refused to implement the agreement, under pressure from organized labor in the United States. For an analysis of the Mexican trucking issue, see http://www.freetrade.org/node/107 and http://www.freetrade.org/node/818.
On May 15, 2007, the House voted 411-3 (Roll Call Vote 349) to approve the Safe American Roads Act of 2007 that effectively prohibits the Secretary of Transportation from granting a motor carrier domiciled in Mexico authority to operate beyond U.S. municipalities and commercial zones on the U.S.-Mexico border.
On September 11, 2007, the Senate voted 75-23 (Roll Call Vote 331) to approve an amendment by Sen. Byron Dorgan that would deny funding for a pilot program that would allow Mexican trucks to begin serving U.S. destinations.
On September 9, 2008, the House voted 395-18 (Roll Call Vote 575) to prohibit the Secretary of Transportation from authorizing any Mexican motor carriers form operating anywhere inside the Untied States beyond the commercial zones along the U.S.-Mexican border.
•Temporary visas for low-skilled workers The American economy continues to create hundreds of thousands of net new jobs each year for low-skilled workers, while the supply of native-born Americans who have traditionally filled those jobs, typically those without a high school education, continues to shrink. Yet are immigration system offer no legal channel for a sufficient number of foreign-born workers to enter the country to fill those jobs, resulting in a significant inflow of illegal immigrants. In May and June of 2007, the Senate considered legislation to expand opportunities for low-skilled foreign-born workers to join the U.S. workforce legally. For analysis of immigration reform, see http://www.freetrade.org/issues/immigration.html.
On May 22, 2007, the Senate voted 31-64 (Roll Call Vote 174) against an amendment by Sen. Byron Dorgan (D-ND) that would have eliminated the Y-1 temporary worker visa from a comprehensive immigration reform bill (S. 1348).
On May 23, 2007, the Senate voted 74-24 (Roll Call Vote 175) to approve an amendment by Sen. Jeff Bingaman to cap the annual number of Y-1 visas in S. 1348 at 200,000, significantly below the number in the original bill.
•Funding for Visa Waiver Program The U.S. government currently allows travelers from 27 countries to enter the United States without a visa. Participants in the program include Japan, Australia and the nations of Western Europe. The program allows visitors to stay in the United States for up to 90 days for tourism and business travel. According to federal studies, the program stimulates increased tourist spending and other economic activity without compromising homeland security. For more on the program, see http://www.freetrade.org/node/577.
On June 15, 2007, the House voted 76-347 (Roll Call Vote 484) against an amendment by Rep. Tom Tancredo (R-CO) to eliminate funding for the visa waiver program.
•Andean Trade Preference Act 2007 Congress enacted the Andean Trade Preference Act in 1991 in an effort to promote market-led growth in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru as an alternative to the illegal drug trade. The act allows duty-free access to the U.S. market for 5,600 products, including a range of agricultural commodities and textile and apparel products of particular export interest in those countries. Such unilateral preferences allow farmers and other producers in the Andean countries to receive higher prices for their exports, stimulating production and income growth in those countries. The ATPA was expanded under the Trade Act of 2002, and was due to expire on June 30, 2007.
On June 27, 2007, the House voted 365-59 (Roll Call Vote 583) to approve an extension the ATPA through February 29, 2008. On June 28, 2007, the Senate approved the bill without amendment by unanimous consent.
•Expand Farm Exports to Cuba For almost half a century the U.S. government has maintained an almost total embargo against trade with, travel to, and investment in Cuba. The embargo was implemented shortly after Fidel Castro took power in 1959, but the embargo has failed to change the policies or nature of the island country's communist government. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, any national security argument for the embargo came to an end. While the embargo remains in place, Congress did vote in 2000 to allow limited sales of food and medical supplies to Cuba. For analysis of U.S. policy toward Cuba, see http://www.freetrade.org/issues/cuba.html.
On July 27, 2007, the House voted 182-245 (Roll Call Vote 749) to reject an amendment sponsored by Rep. Charles Rangel (D-NY) that would have relaxed rules on cash sales of U.S. farm products to Cuba. The amendment would also have allowed direct transfers between Cuban banks and U.S. banks and visas to be issued to conduct activities related to purchasing U.S. agricultural goods.
•Repeal sugar protection The federal government supports the domestic price of sugar through a system of import quotas. The result is that American cane and beet sugar producers are guaranteed about 85 percent of the domestic market, while domestic consumers pay two to three times the world price for sugar. The result has been an annual loss to consumers of more than $1 billion, and the loss of thousands of manufacturing jobs in the confectionary and other sugar-consuming industries. The 2008 farm bill actually increased government support for domestic sugar producers. For more on the cost of the sugar program, see http://www.freetrade.org/node/31 and http://www.freetrade.org/node/694.
On July 27, 2007, the House voted 144-282 (Roll Call Vote 751) against an amendment offered by Rep. Danny Davis (D-IL) that would have deleted the sugar program from the Farm, Nutrition, and Bioenergy Act of 2007.
•U.S.-Peru Free Trade Agreement Like previously enacted bilateral and regional agreements, the U.S.-Peru Free Trade Agreement will eventually eliminate almost all tariff barriers between the two countries. Specifically, the agreement will immediately eliminate tariffs on more than two-thirds of U.S. exports to Peru, and phase out remaining barriers within 15 years, while expanding access to services markets. Imports from Peru already face minimal tariffs in the United States because of existing trade preference programs, but the U.S.-Peru FTA would lock in market access and guarantee reciprocal access for U.S. exporters. The agreement would also deepen U.S. ties to a relatively friendly Latin American country. For more information on the benefits of bilateral and regional FTAs, see http://www.freetrade.org/node/66 and http://www.freetrade.org/node/64.
On November 8, 2007, the House voted 285-132 (Roll Call Vote 1060) to approve legislation implementing the U.S.-Peru FTA as negotiated. On December 4, 2007, the Senate voted 77-18 (Roll Call Vote 413) to approve the U.S.-Peru implementing legislation.
•TPA/Colombia Suspension Passed in 2002, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) allows the U.S. president to submit trade agreements to Congress for an up-or-down vote without amendment. Every U.S. president since Gerald Ford has been granted some form of "fast track" authority, which has proven to be an indispensable tool for enacting trade-expanding agreements. In April 2008, President Bush requested that Congress vote on the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement under the terms set by the 2002 TPA statute. The agreement would eliminate almost all barriers to trade between the two countries. The agreement would increase U.S. exports to Colombia by more than $1 billion and would strengthen U.S. ties to a democratic ally in South America. For more on the U.S.-Colombia FTA, see http://www.freetrade.org/node/839.
On April 10, 2008, the House voted 224-195 (Roll Call Vote 181) to change the 2002 TPA law to indefinitely postpone a vote on the U.S.-Colombia FTA as submitted to Congress.
•2007-08 Farm Bill For more than 80 years, the U.S. government has intervened in agricultural production through subsidies and trade barriers aimed at propping up prices and production of certain favored crops. Such policies can cost Americans an estimated $40 billion a year as consumers and taxpayers. They also drive up costs for domestic food-processing companies, and drive down global prices, hurting poor farmers abroad and complicating efforts to open export markets abroad through trade negotiations. Before the House approved a proposed 2007 farm bill in July 2007, it considered several amendments to scale back interventionist farm programs that distort production and trade. The Senate approved the final bill in December 2007. In May 2008, both chambers passed the conference report reconciling the two versions, and then both chambers overrode a presidential veto. For analysis of the trade impact of U.S. agricultural policy, see http://www.freetrade.org/issues/agriculture.
On July 27, 2007, the House voted 117-309 (Roll Call Vote 747) against an amendment by Rep. Ron Kind (D-WI) that would have reduced agricultural subsidies by tightening income eligibility and payment limits.
On July 27, 2007, the House voted 153-271 (Roll Call Vote 750) against an amendment by Rep. John Boehner (R-OH) that would have effectively lowered "loan deficiency payments" to subsidized farmers.
On July 27, 2007, the House voted 175-251 (Roll Call Vote 752) against an amendment by Rep. Mark Udall (D-CO) to reduce the direct payment rate for cotton by two-thirds of a cent.
On December 14, 2007, the Senate voted 79-14 (Roll Call Vote 434) to approve final passage of the Farm, Nutrition and Bioenergy Act of 2007. (The House version of the farm bill contained tax provisions that were unrelated to farm and trade policy, making the bill unsuitable for inclusion in this study.)
On May 14, 2008, the House voted 318-106 (Roll Call Vote 315) to agree to the conference report of the Farm, Nutrition and Bioenergy Act. On May 15, 2008, the Senate voted 81-15 (Roll Call Vote 130) to approve the same conference report.
On May 21, 2008, the House voted 316-108 (Roll Call Vote 346) to override a presidential veto of the Farm, Nutrition and Bioenergy Act. On May 22, 2008, the Senate voted 82-13 (Roll Call Vote 140) to do the same.
•General Motors and Chrysler Bailouts America's automobile market has been highly integrated in the global economy. More than half the cars bought by Americans each year are made by foreign-owned automobile companies, while most foreign-name brand cars sold here are made in foreign-owned plants located in the United States. One third of American automobile industry workers are not employed by the Big Three automakers but by affiliates of foreign-owned automakers. Federal financial support for GM and Chrysler distorts the domestic automobile market by artificially promoting production during a time when demand is slack because of the recession. Federal auto bailouts offer unfair support to two companies at the expense of foreign producers in the U.S. market. For more information on subsidies for U.S. automakers, see http://www.freetrade.org/node/917 and http://www.freetrade.org/node/425.
On December 10, 2008, the House voted 237-170 (Roll Call vote 690) in favor of the Auto Industry Financing and Restructuring Act, which would have authorized up to $14 billion in "bridge loans" to General Motors and Chrysler.
By analyzing how members of Congress voted on those major trade issues, we can determine who in the 110th Congress supported free trade and who favored government intervention. Members were deemed to exhibit a consistent pattern if they voted at least two-thirds of the time either for or against trade barriers and trade subsidies. Those who voted consistently against both trade barriers and subsidies were classified as free traders. Those who voted against trade barriers and for subsidies were classified as internationalists. Those who voted for trade barriers and against subsidies were classified as isolationists. And those who voted for trade barriers and for subsidies were classified as interventionists. Members were rated only if they participated in at least half of the surveyed votes.
Genuine free traders, according to the definition of this study, were as rare in the 110th Congress as they have been in previous congresses. Of the 429 members who voted on more than half the roll call votes identified in this study, only 15 consistently opposed both trade barriers and trade subsidies. Only 5 voted as internationalists, opposing barriers but favoring subsidies. Another 4 voted as isolationist, voting for barriers and against subsidies. Composing by far the largest category, 69 voted as interventionists, favoring both trade barriers and subsidies. The rest of the House, 338 members, had mixed voting records that did not show a consistent pattern.
Of the 15 free traders in the 110th Congress, 13 were Republicans and 2 Democrats. The most consistent free trader in the House was Jeff Flake, a four-term Republican from Arizona. Rep. Flake opposed trade barriers and trade subsidies on every vote he cast in the 110th Congress. Rejecting barriers and subsidies on every vote but two were Judy Biggert (R-IL), John Campbell (R-CA), Joseph Pitts, (R-PA), F. James Sensenbrenner Jr. (R-WI), Christopher Shays (R-CT), and Thomas Tancredo (R-CO). Other free traders were Eric Cantor (R-VA), Michael Castle (R-DE), Jim Cooper (D-TN), Vernon Ehlers (R-MI), Darrell Issa (R-CA), Daniel Lungren (R-CA), Mike Pence (R-IN), and Adam Smith (D-WA).
The five internationalist included three Republicans and two Democrats. The most consistent were Henry Cuellar and Charles Gonzalez, both Democrats from Texas. The other internationalists were John Boozman (R-AR), Kevin Brady (R-TX), and Donald Manzullo (R-IL).
The rarest birds of all in the 110th Congress, according to our methodology, were the isolationists. Only four members of the House voted consistently in favor of trade barriers and against trade subsidies: John Duncan Jr. (R-TN), Clifford Stearns (R-FL), Jane Harman (D-CA), and Virgil Goode Jr. (R-VA).
By far the largest group in the 110th Congress was the Interventionists. Among the 67 members who voted consistently to restrict and subsidize trade were 57 Democrats and 10 Republicans. The most consistent interventionists on trade was John Spratt Jr. ( D-SC), who voted in favor of trade barriers and subsidies at every opportunity. Voting as interventionists on every vote but one were Robert Aderholt (R-AL), Jason Altmire (D-PA), Phil Hare (D-IL), Walter Jones Jr. (R-NC), Jim Marshall (D-GA), Mike McIntyre (D-NC), Steven Rothman (D-NJ), Louise McIntosh Slaughter (D-NY), and Bennie Thompson (D-MS). Also among the interventionists were Peter DeFazio (D-OR) Patrick Kennedy (D-RI), Dennis Kucinich (D-OH), George Miller (D-CA), and James Oberstar (D-MN).
The freedom to trade was a contentious issue in the 110th Congress, often dividing the House along partisan lines. House Republicans voted against trade barriers 51 percent of the time compared to 41 percent on average among Democrats. The divide was deeper on trade subsidies, which Republicans voted against 48 percent of the time compared to 20 percent for Democrats.
Republicans overwhelmingly supported the trade agreement with Peru and proceeding to a vote on a similar agreement with Colombia, while Democrats narrowly opposed the Peru agreement and overwhelming opposed a vote on the Colombia agreement. A solid majority of Republicans voted to reduce agricultural "loan deficiency payments" while an even larger majority of Democrats opposed the reduction. Democrats strongly favored subsidized loans for General Motors and Chrysler, while Republicans were almost as strongly opposed. More than two-thirds of Democrats voted to expand agricultural exports to Cuba, while more than nine out of ten Republicans were opposed.
On a more bipartisan note, members of both parties voted overwhelmingly in favor of the Andean Trade Preferences Act, against defunding the Visa Waiver Program, and in favor of ending a pilot program that allowed certified Mexican trucks to deliver goods inside the United States.
Among the 98 Senators who voted on more than half the roll call votes considered in this study, 9 voted as free traders, 24 as internationalists, 2 as isolationists, and 31 as interventionists. Another 32 had mixed records that defied classification.
Of the 9 free traders in the Senate, all were Republicans. The most consistent were Robert Bennett (R-UT), Jim DeMint (R-SC), Judd Gregg (R-NH), Chuck Hagel (R-NE), and Richard Lugar (R-IN), who voted against trade barriers and subsidies at every opportunity. Also among the free traders were Pete Domenici (R-NM), Jon Kyl (R-AZ), Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), and John Sununu (R-NH).
Among the 24 internationalists in the Senate, 21 were Republicans, 2 Democrats and 1 and independent. Compiling pure voting records as internationalists were Christopher Bond (R-MO), John Cornyn (R-TX), Larry Craig (R-ID), Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX), Trent Lott (R-MS), Mel Martinez (R-FL), and Joseph Lieberman, an independent from Connecticut who caucuses with the Democrats. Also voting as internationalists in the 110th Congress were Mitch McConnell Jr. (R-KY), the current minority leader in the Senate, Edward Kennedy (D-MA), and Ken Salazar (D-CO).
The two isolationist senators in the 110th Congress were from the same party and the same state. Jack Reed and Sheldon Whitehouse, both Democrats from Rhode Island, voted in favor of trade barriers and against trade (read agricultural) subsidies on all seven Senate votes included in this study.
Democrats dominated the ranks of the interventionists, accounting for 30 of the 31 senators who voted consistently in favor of trade barriers and subsidies. Sixteen senators compiled perfect interventionist voting records, voting at every opportunity to maintain barriers against immigrant workers, Mexican trucks, and trade with Peru as well as subsidies for agricultural production. The senators with the most consistent interventionist records in the 110th Congress were Joseph Biden Jr. (D-DE), Barbara Boxer (D-CA), Sherrod Brown (D-OH), Robert Byrd (D-WV), Robert Casey (D-PA), Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-NY), Christopher Dodd (D-CT), Byron Dorgan (D-ND), Russell Feingold (D-WI), Tom Harkin (D-IA), Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Claire McCaskell (D-MO), Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV), Debbie Stabenow (D-MI), Jon Tester (D-MT), and Bernie Sanders, an independent from Vermont.
Partisan divisions in the Senate were the sharpest over trade barriers. In the four votes affecting trade barriers, Republican senators voted for lower barriers an average of 71 percent of the time compared to 26 percent among Democrats. Republicans voted for lower trade subsidies 25 percent of the time compared to only 5 percent among Democrats. Republicans were significantly more likely than Democrats to support the creation of a temporary worker program for low-skilled immigrants. Although majorities in both parties opposed continuing the pilot program that allowed certified Mexican trucks on to U.S. highways, the Republican minority in favor of the program was far larger than the paltry 4 percent of Democrats who supported it. On trade-distorting agricultural subsidies, Democrats voted almost universally in favor, while a quarter of Republicans — still a small minority by any measure — voted against the same subsidies.
Permanent URL: http://www.freetrade.org/congress?tab=109th | Printer-friendly version
During the 109th Congress, members had numerous opportunities to vote on legislation affecting trade barriers, and five other opportunities affecting trade subsidies. In the House, this study identified 13 major bills and amendments with a direct impact on the freedom of Americans to trade with people in the rest of the world, and on 3 that directly affected the level of subsidies doled out by the federal government to promote exports or discourage imports. In the Senate, the study identified another 9 key bills and amendments that directly affected barriers to international commerce, and 2 that involved subsidies for domestic producers facing international competition.
Not all of those votes offer a pure test of support for free trade. By its nature, the legislative process produces compromise legislation that, while aimed primarily at reducing or increasing barriers or subsidies to trade, can also contain relatively minor provisions that would have an ambiguous or contrary impact on free trade.
Each of the bills, amendments and the letter described below represents a reasonably clear attempt to either expand or restrict the freedom to trade. The descriptions are not intended to provide a definitive argument for or against the legislation, but only to explain why, from a free-market perspective, the vote either hinders or promotes free trade as defined above. Where available, studies and articles are cited that provide more detailed arguments. (See Table 1 for a summary of House votes and Table 2 for a summary of Senate votes.)
•China Currency Tariff. A major criticism against U.S. trade with China is that China's pegged currency gives its exporters an "unfair" advantage in the U.S. market. In practice, China has been moving toward a more flexible currency regime while its economy continues to become more open to international trade and investment. An amendment introduced in the 109th Congress would have imposed a steep 27.5 percent tariffs on imports from China if its government does not move rapidly toward a more flexible currency. Passage of such a measure would punish millions of Americans consumers with higher prices while jeopardizing American exports to our fastest growing major export market.
On April 6, 2005, the Senate voted 33-67 (Roll Call Vote 86) to reject a motion to table (reject) an amendment by Sens. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) and Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) that would have imposed steep tariffs on imports from China if its government did not reform its currency regime.
•WTO Withdrawal. The World Trade Organization and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, have promoted global trade liberalization through successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. The WTO provides an institutional framework that discourages governments from backsliding on their commitments to liberalization and encourages the rule of law through impartial dispute settlement. The GATT and the WTO have facilitated lower global trade barriers against manufactured goods, contributing to a continuing increase in global trade volumes. Increased trade has helped to raise living standards in the United States and other nations that have opened themselves to the international economy. Some opponents of the WTO, while supporting free trade in general, believe the WTO is a threat to U.S. sovereignty, but the WTO possesses no authority of its own to compel members to conform to its rulings. A provision in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, passed by Congress in 1994, guarantees opponents of the WTO an opportunity every five years to vote on a withdrawal resolution.
On June 8, 2005, the House voted 86-338 (Roll Call Vote 239) to reject H.J. Res. 27, which would have withdrawn the United States from the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization.
•Cuba Trade and Travel. The United States has maintained a comprehensive economic embargo against Cuba for more than four decades in an unsuccessful effort to oust the communist government of Fidel Castro. The 109th Congress considered legislation to loosen the embargo by granting Americans greater freedom to visit and export to Cuba. The almost total embargo has failed to achieve its policy objective of overthrowing the Cuban government or of even modifying its oppressive rule. American citizens have paid the price of that failure in lost economic freedom to trade, invest, and travel. The embargo has deprived Cuban citizens of economic opportunity while giving the Cuban government a handy excuse for the failures of its socialist economic system.
On June 29, 2005, the Senate voted 60-35 (Roll Call Vote 167) in favor of a an amendment by Sen. Byron Dorgan (D-N.D.) to the Interior Department appropriations bill to ease travel restrictions to Cuba. The motion required a two-thirds majority under suspension of the rules and thus failed to pass.
On June 30, 2005, the House voted 208-211 (Roll Call Vote 345) to reject an amendment by Rep. Jim Davis (R-FL.) that would have denied funds to the U.S. Treasury Department to enforce the ban on travel by U.S. citizens to Cuba.
On June 30, 2005, the House voted 169-250 (Roll Call Vote 348) against an amendment offered by Rep. Charles Rangel (D-NY) that would have denied funding to enforce the general economic and trade embargo against Cuba.
•Punish Companies that Incorporate "Offshore." Companies should be free to base their operations in locations that best serve their customers and shareholders, whether in the United States or in other countries. And Congress should spend taxpayer dollars wisely by awarding contracts to providers that can offer the best value for the public. Congress should not use its procurement process to punish companies that are incorporated in other countries because of differing tax systems or other legitimate business concerns. In 2005, Congress considered an amendment to prohibit use of funds in an appropriations bill "to enter into any contract with an incorporated entity where such entity's sealed bid or competitive proposal shows that such entity is incorporated or chartered in Bermuda, Barbados, the Cayman Islands, Antigua, or Panama."
On June 30, 2005, the House voted 190-231 (Roll Call Vote 351) to reject an amendment by Rep. Rosa L. DeLauro (D-CT) that would have banned the awarding of federal contracts with companies located in alleged "tax havens."
•Foreign Investment in the United States. A free and open economy should welcome foreign investment. Investment in the United States allows foreign-owned companies to serve American customers most directly, and to earn competitive returns in the world's largest market. For the U.S. economy, foreign investment means lower interest rates, creation of well-paying jobs, and the introduction of innovative technology and business practices. The 109th Congress considered legislation that would bar certain foreign investment in "sensitive" sectors such as energy, port management, and domestic airline service. The bills targeted politically sensitive investments even though the federal government already has established a process to examine and potentially block investment proposals that pose legitimate national security concerns.
On June 30, 2005, the House voted 333-92 (Roll Call Vote 353) to deny funding for executive-branch approval of the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company's proposed purchase of the U.S. oil company UNOCAL.
On March 15, 2006, the House rejected, by a vote of 38-377 (Roll Call Vote 43), an amendment that would have allowed the United Arab Emirates-based company Dubai Ports World to acquire ownership of a company that manages the operation of several U.S. ports.
On June 14, 2006, the House voted 291-137 (Roll Call Vote 283) to bar an increase in the allowable share of foreign ownership of U.S.-based airlines.
On March 16, 2006, the Senate voted 44-55 (Roll Call Vote 53) against a bill that would have mandated a study of foreign ownership of U.S. Treasury bills.
•Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA). DR-CAFTA eliminated or will phase out tariffs on almost all two-way trade between the United States and the Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The agreement liberalizes a significant amount of trade and also represents an important foreign policy initiative to a group of countries that have achieved significant economic and political reforms in recent years. The 109th Congress approved DR-CAFTA, arguably the most import free trade agreement since the North American Free Trade Agreement passed Congress in 1993.
On July 28, 2005, the House voted 217-215 (Roll Call Vote 443) to appro
